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ABSTRACT 
Paramedic judgment and decision-making, not unlike much of ambulance practice, have not 
been the subject of systematic, sustained research.  There exists a paucity of research or 
inquiry that examines the mechanics of human error in paramedic practice, ambulance or 
pre-hospital settings.  Little is known of how paramedics make judgments and decisions, and 
how paramedics deal with risk and uncertainty they commonly face in their tasks and the 
environment in which they work in. The literature and theories on judgment and decision-
making are as extensive as they are controversial and the scientific community is yet to 
obtain a comprehensive understanding of the risk and uncertainty in judgment and decision-
making. 
 
The following paper provides an introduction to the concepts of error, risk, and uncertainty 
in the context of paramedic judgment and decision-making, discussion of two analytic 
frameworks that examine such error, risk, and uncertainty, and commentary on their 




Human judgment and error therein are critical elements of human activity and professional 
practice.  Risk management strategies are methods that aim to limit the occurrence and 
impact of errors in human judgment.  However, human judgment by its very nature always 
presents with the risk of error.  Hammond,[2] in a meta-analysis of research into human 
judgment, refers to this as ‘irreducible uncertainty, inevitable error and unavoidable 
injustice’.  Institutions and organisations regulate human judgment using policies, 
procedures, standards and guidelines.  Such instruments are however far from fallible.  
According to Hammond[2, p. 35], “uncertainty in the creation of social policy makes error 
inevitable, and error makes the injustice unavoidable”. 
 
Hammond[2] suggests that physicians and health care workers have always lived and will 
continue to live with irreducible uncertainty in diagnosis, prognosis, therapy, and indeed 
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virtually all phases of their professional activities.  Some specialties within medicine and 
health carry with them additional risk, and have been identified and referred to as ‘high-risk 
practices’.[5]  Health care professionals in the emergency care, obstetrics, surgical, 
anaesthetic, general practice, oncology, paediatric intensive care, and psychiatric settings are 
faced with levels of risk that far exceed those of most other areas of medicine.  The reasons 
for this are many and varied, but a common theme across all relates to the notion of risk and 
uncertainty.  
 
Accidents in medicine cost human lives, create widespread environmental damage, and 
generate much public and political concern.[4]  Individuals, organisations and institutions are 
today being called to account for their judgments and decisions more than ever before.  
Societal concern is growing for greater transparency in the decisions taken on its behalf by 
policy-makers and the professionals charged with interpreting and delivering the policies of 
central governments.[7]  Health care workers, particularly paramedics, are taking on new 
roles— promoting health, giving diagnostic advice and prognostic information to patients, 
performing complicated and invasive medical procedures, assessing health risks and 
screening for early signs of treatable disease— in many cases with decreasing direct 
supervision.  The freedom of health care professionals like doctors, nurses, psychologists and 
others to practise more autonomously has been accompanied by increased professional 
accountability for individual decision-making.  Accountability for decision-making is the 
cornerstone of a largely self-regulated profession.[7]  The relationship between knowledge 
and decision-making has been a crucial element of many health professions’ attempts to 
increase their professional status—which many, such as medicine and dentistry, have 
achieved—spearheaded largely by the birth of evidence-based medicine.  However, health 
‘professions’ such as nursing and ambulance are yet to develop this relationship between 
knowledge, judgment, and decision-making, particularly in the paramedic ecology, that is the 
total contexts in which paramedics are engaged in decision-making.  Clinical guidelines, 
protocols and procedures govern much of paramedic practice, designed to assist the 
paramedic in their decisions about patient care.  Clinical guidelines and procedures are forms 
of social policy—that is, they propose regulatory principles of action for adoption by 
individuals, groups and organisations.  As such they are results of social construction, 
accounts and representations of people.  The effect of the use of clinical guidelines and 
protocols (as social policy within ambulance services) on the accountability of paramedic for 
the quality of care, and indeed management error, warrants investigation as does the 
relationships between knowledge, judgment and decision-making in light of the introduction 
of such guidelines.  
 
Research into human clinical judgment in medicine and health is largely restricted to the 
medical and nursing professions.  Although the ‘medical practitioner’ is central to Western 
models of medical practice, the practice and activity of other health-care professionals have 
an equally critical role in patient care outcome.  Shaban[6] regards paramedics as important 
health-care professionals with a critical and unrecognised role in the continuum of health 
care.  “Judgment under uncertainty is one of the most pervasive and difficult aspects of life” 
[2, p. 35], and paramedics are routinely required to work in environments of extreme and 
constant uncertainty, extending from multiple sources with multiple, synergistic effects.  
Paramedics, for example, are routinely called to attend to an unknown incident where the 
communications centre has been unable to obtain any case related information.  Ambulances 
are routinely sent to locations on request from third party callers (callers not present at the 
scene with little or no information).  Often emergencies calls are made to the 
telecommunications carrier (e.g. 000 in Australia) but where the caller hang-ups or their 
connection is lost (eg. mobile phones fall out of range) before any information is obtained.  
On arrival paramedics are often faced with difficult and complex situations that require 
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immediate and emergency intervention.  Yet ambulance or paramedic clinical judgment has 
not been the subject of systematic sustained research.  A thorough investigation of the 
literature located few studies that clinical judgment and decision-making practices of 
paramedics.  We argue that research into judgment practices of paramedics is warranted in 
order to minimise irreducible uncertainty, inevitable error, and unavoidable injustice [2] in 
the delivery of quality and appropriate health care.  To this end, we explore theoretical 
conceptualisations about decision-making, addressing their relevance to the study of 
decision-making in field of paramedic practice.   
 
This paper introduces two distinct conceptual frameworks—the ‘mechanics of error’[4,5] and 
the ‘lens-model’.[1,2]  In relation to the first of these, Reason[4,5] examines the fundamental 
concepts of error in adverse events, and the ‘mechanics of error’, referring to this as the 
‘human condition’.  The framework proposed by Reason[5] gives researchers insight into the 
mechanics of error in human judgment and useful risk management strategies by systematic 
identification of the nature of the error in qualitative ways.  However judgment analysis 
outlined by Reason[5] does not acknowledge, or places little or no emphasis on, risk and 
uncertainty in judgment processes.  The second conceptual framework proposed by Cooksey 
[1] and Hammond[2] does allow for some characterisation of or insight into risk and 
uncertainty, and is useful in describing judgment processes in instances where the ‘task’ of an 
individual is not known, particularly in paramedic settings where individuals are often 
required to respond to ‘unknown incidents’.  This model is particularly relevant in the context 
of risk analysis and management strategies associated with unknown ‘tasks’ inside ill-
defined, dynamic, uncertain environments with shifting and competing high-stakes goals.   
 
 
The ‘Human Condition’, adverse events and error 
 
Human contribution is arguably the central element of error in human clinical judgment.  
Initial research into human clinical judgment in medicine focused heavily on the work of 
intensivists and anaesthetists.  A survey of published work on human factors estimated that 
while the absolute numbered accidents decreased the contribution of human error to accidents 
in hazardous technologies increased fourfold between the 1960s and 1990s from minima of 
around 20% to maxima of beyond 90%.[3]  This is due largely to improvement in the 
accuracy, efficacy, and quality of technology and equipment, which in effect shifts the 
aetiology of error away from ‘equipment’ and towards ‘the operator’.  Fundamentally, 
equipment is designed, built, operated, organised, and maintained by people.  Regardless of 
the true figure of attributable error, human behaviour clearly dominates the risks to modern 
technological systems and practice in medicine.[5] 
 
 
Error and the Human Condition  
 
The human contribution to error in clinical judgment may be analysed a number of ways 
depending on the nature of the enquiry.  Reason[5] provides an analytic framework for the 
examination of errors in a mechanical context.  Rather than classify all errors in human 
clinical judgment as ‘human error’, Reason[5] argues that constructivist analysis of error is 
critical to psychological, sociological, and contextual understanding.  Error has three defining 
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Distinction 1 – Slips and Lapses vs Mistakes 
All errors represent some kind of deviation in preferred action or outcome.  Defining error as 
a ‘failure of planned actions to achieve their desired goal’, Reason[5] argued that error could 
generally be classified in two ways.  These are outlined in the Figure1.2 below: 
 











At the primary level, errors may be attributed to matters relating to ‘execution failures’, 
where the ‘plan’ is adequate and remains ‘on-track’ but the actions associated with it do not 
work out as intended.  Typically, these may be caused by ‘slips’ that are related to attentional 
failures and ‘lapses’ where failure in memory may occur.    They may be further classified as 
outlined by Reason[5] in Figure 1.3 below: 
 
Distinction 2 
Errors vs Violations 
Distinction 3 
Active vs Latent Human Failures 
Distinction 1 
Slips and lapses vs Mistakes 
Error 
Errors 
Slips, lapses, trips and fumbles: 
execution failures 
Mistakes:  
planning or problem solving 
Journal of Emergency Primary Health Care (JEPHC), Vol.2, Issue 1-2, 2004 
 
Author(s): Shaban et al. 5










According to Reason[4,5] slips and lapses occur within the context of largely automated 
function in routine tasking, and are largely concerned with attentional failure of the subject.  
As an example, the incorrect identification of chest pain as symptomatic of indigestion rather 
than an acute myocardial infarction (AMI) may be classified as a ‘recognition failure’.  If a 
paramedic, in administering salicylic acid as anti-thrombolytic therapy in instances of cardiac 
chest pain, forgets to check if the patient has an allergy to the medication, or forgets a 
contraindication of the drug and administers it, that may be viewed as a ‘memory failure’.   
These are however illustrative examples only.  Research evidence, using this framework, is 
needed. 
 
In contrast, ‘mistakes’ are said to occur when actions go entirely as planned, but the plan 
itself deviates from an adequate path.  In this circumstance, “‘mistakes’ involve higher order 
cognition such as planning, formulating intentions, judging, and problem solving”.[5, p. 12]  
A problem—defined as anything that requires a change or alteration of the current plan—
.occurs in ‘mistakes’.  Typically, ‘mistakes’ can be classified in two ways, as outlined in 
Figure 1.4. 
 
Mistakes may be rule-based or knowledge-based.  In cases where a mistake is rule-based, the 
focus of the error revolves around a ‘rule’ of practice representing knowledge.  More 
specifically, it pertains to the use of a ‘bad’ rule or the non-use or inappropriate use of a 
‘good’ rule.  Reason[5] suggests that knowledge-based mistakes are characterised by the use 
of slow, resource-limited but computationally powerful conscious reasoning carried out in 
relation to what is often an inaccurate and incomplete ‘mental model’ of the problem and its 
causes.  
 












Slips and Lapses 
‘Mistakes’ 
Rule-based mistakes:  
focused of ‘rule’ of practice; use of 
‘bad’ rule, or non-use or inappropriate 
use of ‘good’  rule of knowledge. 
Knowledge-based mistakes: 
novel situations with little or no ‘rule’ 
use; lack of knowledge. 
Journal of Emergency Primary Health Care (JEPHC), Vol.2, Issue 1-2, 2004 
 
Author(s): Shaban et al. 6
 
Distinction 2 – Errors vs Violations 
 
According to Reason,[5] the second major distinction when analysing error involves the 
notions of errors and violations.  Violations are deviations from safe operating practice, 
procedures, standards, or rules, and may be classified as routine, optimising, or necessary 
(situational), and are illustrated in Figure 1.5.  Reason[5] pointed out that error and violations 
differ in a number of important ways.  Errors are born largely from informational problems 
where the information is forgotten, incomplete, incorrect, or unknown, whereas violations are 
extensions with motivational dimensions. In preventing errors in the workplace, 
improvements in information-sharing and disseminating systems are required, including 
education, training, and professional development.  Violations require organisational and 
motivational solutions that may build on errors in management systems. 
 














Distinction 3 – Active vs Latent Human Failure 
The third and final element to the fundamental analysis of error as described by Reason[5] 
relates to the difference in the active or latent nature of error.  Within this framework, active 
human error is such that the result of the error is negative and immediately, or almost 
immediately, known involving unsafe acts (errors or violations).  For example, in psychiatry 
the failure to undertake a comprehensive mental health assessment of a patient may result in 
the inaccurate diagnosis of a patient condition wherein a condition is missed.  This is typical 
of conditions such as suicidal ideations, violence, schizophrenia, and the affective psychoses.  
Many case studies have been reported where this has occurred, resulting in an almost 
immediate and significant consequence with the patient suiciding or committing a violent act 
such as rape or murder[3].  Examples here in paramedic practice could include the failure to 
invoke an involuntary treatment order and transport patients with an acute psychotic illness 
with suicidal ideations.  Should the patient self-harm after being ‘seen’ by paramedics, this 
could be viewed as an ‘active error’.  Similarly the withholding of medication such as 
glyceryl trinitrate from a patient experiencing angina or chest pain, without justifiable cause 
or reason such as contraindication, resulting in deterioration of patient condition such as AMI  
Violations 
Optimising violations – taken to further 
personal rather than task-related goals (e.g. 
alleviate boredom, getting ‘kick-backs’). 
Necessary or Situational violations – 
Only one path is available to complete task and 
rules and procedures are seen as inappropriate 
for situation. 
Routine Violations - ‘cutting corners’ whenever 
the opportunity presents itself. 
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or cardiac arrest may be characterised as an ‘active error’.  
 
Conversely, latent failures are the result of decisions made or by positions taken by 
organisations as a whole, where the damaging consequence may lie dormant for some time 
only becoming evident when local triggering factors overcome the organisations defence 
mechanisms.[5] 
 
The following section presents what is referred to by Cooksey[1] as the ‘Lens Model’ as an 
alterative means of exploring the ecology and judgment and the nature of decision-making. 
   
The ‘Lens’ Model of Judgment Analysis – An Introduction 
The ‘Lens Model’ is an alternative approach for the study of human judgment, proposing 
scope and theoretical framework constructs for judgment analysis. According to Hammond 
[2, p.167] “an organism is depicted as a lens; that is, it ‘collects’ the information from the 
many cues that emanate from an object and refocuses them within the cognitive system of the 
organism in the form of a judgment about the object”.   Cooksey[1] presents a number of 
variations in ‘lens-model’ analytic assessment systems, each placing different emphasis on 
the different aspects, types, and contexts of judgment. Two types are described briefly herein. 
 
The ‘single-system’ is an analytic method that focuses on the judgment process itself, with 
minimal or no reference to information about the variables of criteria under study, the nature 
of the task environment, the social dimension, or the nature of interrelatedness of the 
judgment process and task environment.[1]  Hammond[2] illustrates this in the Figure 1.6. 
The ‘ecology’ or ‘criteria’ of the task environment are characteristically unknown.  “The 
‘single-system’ lens model is a pictorial representation of the presence of: 
 
(1) multiple fallible indicators or lenses (centre); 
(2) their differential degrees of validity (thickness of lines indicates degree of 
validity); 
(3) their interrelationships (dashed lines); 
(4) degrees of utilisation (or weight by judge); and, 
(5) accuracy of judgment” 
(Hammond [2, p. 168])   
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In this characterisation of judgment, the accuracy of information can be described in terms of 
its ecological reliability and the accuracy of a cue or indicator is described in terms of its 
ecological validity.[1] Both, along with time, have impacts on judgment.  However, the 
central tenet of this system is that the judgment is based on the premise that the ecology of 
the task is unknown.  An intangible event has occurred and, from that event through multiple 
fallible ‘cues’ with varying degrees of validity each interrelated with different weighting, 
judgment is made about the event.   
 
This particular system is useful when considering the environment or ecology of paramedic 
practice.  Paramedics are routinely faced with managing an ‘event’ where the characteristics 
of the event itself and the surrounding environment or ecology are unknown. Paramedics are 
often required to work in high stakes, time critical, uncertain and dynamic environments with 
ill defined, shifting, and competing goals.  The quality and accuracy of the judgment is 
dependent on, among other things, intangible events that occur within the ecology or context 
of actual practice.  This process would allow some insight into the judgment of the 
individual, focusing on the judgment itself regardless of the other factors such as information 
about the variables of criteria under study, the nature of the task environment, the social 
dimension, or the nature of interrelatedness of the judgment process and task environment.  
This then allows the description of such factors without emphasis on the relativity of such 
factors. Such a technique would be useful in the primary analysis of the judgments of 
paramedics when attending patients with conditions of unknown aetiology, typically by case 
audit or review.  In doing so, this analytic technique allows researchers to ‘build’ pictures of 
judgment of intangible events.  In comparison, the ‘double-system’ lens model differs from 
its single counterpart in that in this analytic framework the judgment cognitive system is 
compared explicitly with a known task or ecology.  This is illustrated in Figure 1.7 below 
from Cooksey.[1] 
 
The strength of this analytic method is in its ability to give insight into judgments about 
known tasks or events.  Cooksey[1, p. 61] outlined that “ in this system one needs to have 
available not only a sample of cue profiles (Xi)—representing cases or situations (real or 
simulated)—for judgment (Ys), but also a distal criterion measure or outcome (Ye) that is 
explicitly tied to each profile”.  The inclusion of explicit task outcomes provides insight into 
functional interactions between the person and the ecology being examined.  Cues and their 
correlation in the ecological context are critical here, as found in the ‘single-system’.  
Additionally, the ecological validity of each cue with respect to the criterion measure can be 
addressed and one can assess how well the ecology can be modelled on the basis of the cues. 
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The strength of the ‘double-system’ lens model is that it not only considers the judgment 
process but also gives consideration to the task conditions and implies comparison of the 
judgment with an objective assessment task outcome to gauge judgmental accuracy.  This 
analytic method is useful in examining the characteristics of acknowledged experts’ 
judgments in comparison with an available or known task.  Therefore, it is assumed that 
participants have the requisite knowledge needed to exercise judgment, and that the ‘double-
system’ lens model is used to demonstrate how the ‘expert’ uses knowledge in the context of 
varying ecology.  Regression techniques are used to derive a statistical equation or algorithm, 
revealing how much weight is attached to each item of information related to the ecological 
situation or used in the judgment.[1] 
 
Discussion 
The approaches advocated by Reason[4], and Cooksey[1] and Hammond[2], are two of many 
competing theories that attempt to account for and investigate human judgment.  Both 
frameworks provide insight of a type into judgment processes of individuals.   
 
The error analytic framework provided by Reason[5] allows researchers to gain limited 
insight into the mechanics of error in human judgment.  At present, little systematic and 
sustained examination of the investigation of error in ambulance and paramedic practice has 
been reported in the published literature. While traditional investigative case study techniques 
used satisfy organisational, institutional and legislative requirements, their application and 
importance with respect to development of professional ‘bodies of knowledge’, future risk 
management, education, training and research are not known.  The systematic analysis of 
errors in paramedic practice using models proposed by Reason[5] may allow for greater 
success of risk management strategies by systematic identification of the nature of the error in 
more qualitative ways.  For example, whether an error in paramedic practice is due to ‘slips, 
lapses, trips or fumbles’ as opposed to ‘mistakes’, as well as considerations relating to 
frequency, and consequence across a population, aid in developing risk management 
strategies in more productive, time efficient appropriate ways.  The systematic monitoring 
and reporting of the types, nature, context, consequences and characteristics of error can 
serve to inform, for example, new needs of education and training programs, problems with 
policies, procedures and work instructions, or other factors otherwise unknown within the 
professional setting. 
 
Importantly however, judgment analysis outlined by Reason[5] does not acknowledge, or 
places little or no emphasis on, risk and uncertainty in judgment processes.  The framework 
proposed by Cooksey[1] and Hammond[2] does however allow for some characterisation of 
or insight into risk and uncertainty.  The ‘Single-System Lens Model’ is useful in describing 
judgment processes in instances where the ‘task’ of an individual is not known, particularly 
in paramedic settings where individuals are often required to respond to ‘unknown incidents’.  
This model is particularly relevant in the context of risk analysis and management strategies 
associated with unknown tasks inside ill-defined, dynamic, uncertain environments with 
shifting, high-stake and competing goals.  Conversely the ‘Double-System Lens Model’ may 
be useful to describe the individual judgment relating to known tasks.  Both systems seek to 
characterise the cues from which, or the ‘lenses’ through which, the individual associates his 
or her judgment. Neither framework however seems to be interested in describing actual 
judgment processes.  The use of individual paradigms that over-simplify, rationalise, or fail to 
take into account or acknowledge the full complexity of judgment processes have been 
heavily criticised in the literature.[7]   
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Conclusion 
Risk and uncertainty exist in human clinical judgment in all forms, disciplines, and faces of 
medicine.  Medicine, although built upon pillars of beneficence and non-maleficence, 
arguably is not an exact science, if ever such an entity existed.   Hammond[2] has argued that 
uncertainty in medicine is treated roughly the same today as it was a half a century ago.  
Despite the formation of multiple theories and paradigms of judgment and decision-making, 
medicine has only recently begun to take steps to cope with the consequences of uncertainty.   
Referring to evidence about advances in how medical knowledge is used, Hammond[2, p.35] 
asserts that: 
 
There is little evidence that we are any more proficient today at 
making use of the hard-won medical knowledge that is 
available to us than we were a half a century ago, and much 
evidence that we are not.  Irreducible uncertainty and its 
inevitable consequences remain formidable barriers to an 
effective distribution of knowledge.  
 
Judgment under uncertainty is one of the most pervasive and 
difficult aspects of life.  Uncertainty in the creation of social 
policy makes error inevitable, and error makes the injustice 
unavoidable.  
 
The literature and theories on judgment and decision-making are as extensive as they are 
controversial. The fragmented nature of theories and studies to date within the general health 
disciplines addressing aspects of clinical judgment process has not yet resulted in a 
comprehensive understanding of the phenomena [7] or a suitable universal model or 
theoretical framework.  In this paper, just two theories to explore judgment have been 
examined.  The human judgment and error analytic techniques described by Reason[4], 
Cooksey[1] and Hammond[2] provide different methods to gain some insight into human 
judgment with mechanical, psychological and/or sociological emphasis.  More research in 
this area is needed.  The use of such methods to investigate judgment may mitigate 
irreducible uncertainty, inevitable error, and unavoidable injustice in the provision of pre-
hospital emergency care. 
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